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‘DOCKING STATIONS:’ DESIGNING A MORE 
WELCOMING ARCHITECTURE FOR A POST-





Different actions by countries with different circumstances will 
need different docking stations of support. So what tools will you 
create within the climate change regime to deliver on adaptation 
and mitigation? How will you use those tools to develop a self-
financing climate compact? 
—Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Statement at the high-level segment of 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, Poznan, Poland, 11 December 2008.1 
 
The nations of the world are all in this global boat together. It is not 
a boat of which only half will sink while the other half stays afloat. 
Unless we all pull our oars in the same direction and plug the large 
leaks as well as the small leaks, our ship will flounder and surely 
sink. 
—U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, statement during floor debate on 
S. Res. 98, the “Byrd-Hagel Resolution,” Cong. Rec. S8115, 25 July 
1997. 
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 1. Yvo de Boer, Executive Sec’y, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Fourteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 14) and the Fourth Session 
of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(COP/MOP 4), (Dec. 11, 2008), http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/statements/application/ 
pdf/cop_14_hls_statement_de_boer.pdf. 
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The credibility of the United States is not enhanced when the 
administration negotiates a treaty that has no hope of ratification in 
the U.S. Senate. 
 
—U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel, statement during floor debate on S. 
Res. 98. , the “Byrd-Hagel Resolution,” Cong. Rec. S8115, 25 July 
1997. 
 
In 2009, efforts to address global climate change are underway in 
a wide range of forums. Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol 
aim to adopt, in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009, a new 
instrument to replace Kyoto, whose legally binding emissions caps 
expire in 2012. The G-8 Summit to be held in Maddalena, Italy, in 
July 2009; discussions in the Major Economies Forum (MEF) process; 
and heads of state discussions initiated by UN Secretary General 
Ban-Ki Moon are all expected to address climate change. In 2008, the 
European Union adopted a climate & energy package that aims to 
reduce EU emissions 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, and in January 
2009 the European Commission released proposals for the design of a 
new instrument at Copenhagen. Legislation to cap U.S. greenhouse 
gas emissions will be considered in the U.S. Congress in 2009. The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is also 
expected to begin exercising its authority, recently reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court,2  to regulate carbon dioxide under the U.S. Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 7521(a)(1). And efforts are underway among U.S. 
states, working in partnership with other states and provinces around 
the world. 
One point is consistently emerging from all of these discussions.  
To keep open options for realizing the objective of the UNFCCC, 
namely stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases at a level and in a timeframe so as to avert dangerous climate 
change,3 efforts to slow, stop and reverse the increase in greenhouse 
 
 2. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 3. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, done May 9, 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC]. Numerous commentators consider limiting 
warming to not more than 2° C from pre-industrial levels to be a central measure of success in 
achieving the UNFCCC objective. NATHANIEL KEOHANE & PETER GOLDMARK, ENVTL. DEF. 
FUND, WHAT WILL IT COST TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM GLOBAL WARMING? 2 (2007). See 
generally AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al. eds., 
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gases must move as rapidly as possible in all major emitting nations, 
including industrialized nations, emerging economic powers, and 
developing countries. It is the thesis of this paper that the chances for 
realizing the objective of the UNFCCC can be improved significantly 
if governments construct cap-and-trade markets for global warming 
pollution, and if they include, in both the national legislation and any 
new international climate accord creating these cap-trade markets, 
what I call ‘docking stations’4 – i.e., provisions that welcome, rather 
than ward off, the participation of major emitting nations. 
To some readers, such a thesis may sound obvious, or even 
trivial, on first reading. Of course all major emitting nations should be 
encouraged to join global efforts to cut emissions. Some recent 
scholarship, pointing to the lack of broad participation in emissions 
caps, has suggested that, rather than trying to expand emissions cap-
and-trade markets to include new nations, it would be preferable 
instead to cut “political deals . . . that favor relatively climate-friendly 
technologies.”5 Putting aside, for the moment, the problems 
associated with government picking technology winners, it is the 
thesis of this paper that insufficient evidence has been given to the 
role that key provisions, embedded in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, have played in discouraging broader participation in carbon 
markets. It is evident that the dominant policy trend at the opening of 
2009 is the development of cap-and-trade programs in the United 
States6 and around the world, with the goal of placing legally binding 
limits on the emissions of global warming pollution, and creating 
carbon markets that drive innovation in low-carbon technologies, job 
 
2006). Others, however, urge much more stringent limits. See e.g., James Hansen, et al., Target 
Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217 (2008). 
 4. The author first used the phrase “docking stations” in a short paper published under 
the Environmental Defense Fund’s logo in August 2008. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Spurring Swift 
Action to cut Emissions: How “Docking Stations” Can Help, Aug. 20, 2008, available at http:// 
www.edf.org/documents/8304_DockingStationfinal_Ghana.pdf, for an early discussion of 
docking stations. 
 5. See Thomas Heller, Climate Change: Designing an Effective Response, in GLOBAL 
WARMING: LOOKING BEYOND KYOTO 115, 140 (Ernesto Zedillo ed., 2008). 
 6. “But to truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from 
the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the 
profitable kind of energy. So I ask this Congress to send me legislation that places a market-
based cap on carbon pollution and drives the production of more renewable energy in 
America.” Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Address to Joint Session 
of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009) (text available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress/). 
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creation, and economic growth.7 This article asserts that rather than 
‘abandon[ing] the quest to build inclusive trading markets,”8 nations 
should replace the roadblocks to participation embedded in existing 
agreements with ‘docking stations’ that invite new nations to join 
carbon markets and that facilitate their efforts to do so. 
Part I of this article introduces the concept of ‘docking stations,’ 
and places the concept in historical context with a perspective on the 
absence of welcoming provisions in the current UNFCCC-Kyoto 
Protocol architecture. Given the very high level of concern in the U.S. 
Congress regarding the broad participation of nations in international 
agreements and frameworks to address climate change, Part I also 
considers how the advice given by the United States Senate to date 
under the Advice & Consent clause of the U.S. Constitution weighs in 
favor of including ‘docking stations’ in any new agreement struck at 
Copenhagen, as well as in domestic cap-and-trade legislation in the 
United States. Part II of this article examines analogues to docking 
stations in other international instruments, and proposes 
substantively and procedurally how docking stations might be 
emplaced in new international climate architecture and in U.S. 
legislation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO ‘DOCKING STATIONS’ 
A.  Definition of a Docking Station 
The challenge international environmental treaty drafters face is 
how to formulate environmental protection frameworks in which 
sovereign nations will want to participate.9 The race to avert 
catastrophic climate change is a race to cap and cut global warming 
pollution in the narrow time window – roughly the next decade – that 
scientists indicate is the crucial period for reversing the increase in 
global emissions, if the worst consequences of human-induced global 
warming are to be averted.10 It is also a race to deliver more and 
 
 7. See, e.g., John D. Podesta, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Sanderstølen Conference on Energy 
Policy, Role of the U.S. in the World Order (Feb. 4, 2009) (text available at http:// 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/pdf/podesta_norway.pdf); see Gordon Brown, Prime 
Minister of the U.K., Davos World Economic Forum, Building the Global Low Carbon 
Recovery (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page18201. 
 8. See Heller, supra note 5, at 140. 
 9. For this insight, the author is indebted to John Kobayashi, formerly of Holme Roberts 
& Owen LLP, in whose memory this article is dedicated. 
 10. See, e.g., KEOHANE ET AL., supra note 3, at 2. See generally AVOIDING DANGEROUS 
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3. But see Michel G.J. den Elzen & Detlef P. van Vuuren, 
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cleaner energy to the world’s poor, spur innovation in low-carbon 
technologies and processes, drive down the costs of climate policy, 
and generate maximum economic benefits for the transition to a 
global low-carbon economy. To date, carbon markets offer the 
greatest potential for attracting the voluntary participation of 
sovereigns in frameworks for confronting this daunting array of 
challenges. 
While many policy inquiries have begun to consider what policy 
architecture frameworks may be useful in meeting the challenge of 
climate change,11 few have examined the need for such frameworks to 
welcome new participants in the effort to cap and cut global warming 
pollution. Few, if any, have examined, substantively and procedurally, 
how provisions to welcome new participants might be included in 
these frameworks. 
In the context of carbon markets, one way of conceptualizing 
these welcoming provisions is to think of them as “docking stations,” 
places in the carbon market infrastructure that invite new participants 
to “dock in” to the market – that encourage nations to adopt 
emissions caps, that provide substantive and procedural assistance to 
nations that wish to do so, and that make it easy for them to connect 
with carbon markets.12 This function is similar to “docking stations” in 
the international space station that allow nations’ space exploration 
vehicles to “dock in” to that architecture, or “plug and play” 
hardware and software that allow users to “dock in” to computer 
networks including the World Wide Web. 
 
Peaking Profiles for Achieving Long-Term Temperature Targets with More Likelihood at Lower 
Costs, 104 (Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. Sci. No. 46,  17931-17936, Nov. 13, 2007), available at 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0701598104. 
 11. See, e.g., Henry D. Jacoby et al., Sharing the Burden of GHG Reductions, MIT JOINT 
PROGRAM ON THE SCI. & POL’Y OF GLOBAL CHANGE REP. 167 (2008), available at http:// 
globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt167.pdf. See generally ARCHITECTURES 
FOR AGREEMENT:  ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD, 
(Joseph Aldy & Robert Stavins eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (examining the merits of six 
alternative international architectures for climate policy); Heller, supra note 5 (providing one 
proposal for post-2012 architecture among many). 
 12. For early uses of the term “docking station” in this context, see Envtl. Def. Fund, supra 
note 4, and European Peoples’ Party Political Bureau, Combatting Climate Change: Our 
Responsibility for Future Generations, (adopted Feb. 7, 2008), available at http:// 
www.epp.eu/dbimages/pdf/EN-DOC-CLIMATE-CHANGE%20_FINAL-%20EN.pdf. 
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B. The Need for Docking Stations 
Given the urgency of the climate challenge and the need to 
enroll as many major emitting nations as rapidly as possible in the 
global effort to cap and cut emissions, the need for docking stations 
may sound self-evident. But somewhat surprisingly, the first 
experiments with carbon markets, namely the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change and its parent agreement, the 1992 UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, do not include docking stations. In 
fact, as explained below, key provisions in these agreements erect 
significant procedural and substantive hurdles that make it nearly 
impossible for new nations to join the international effort to cap and 
cut emissions, or that significantly discourage new nations from even 
trying to do so.13 
In 1992 the UNFCCC divided nations into two distinct groups for 
purposes of addressing reductions in national greenhouse gas 
emissions: wealthier industrialized nations, primarily those who were 
at the time members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), plus the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC; and “non-Annex I 
Parties,” consisting of all others.14 While all Parties to the UNFCCC 
accepted a binding obligation to prepare reports on their greenhouse 
gas emissions and emission reduction measures,15 and all 
acknowledged that “the global nature of climate change calls for the 
widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in 
an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities and their social and economic conditions,”16 only the 
Annex I Parties accepted an obligation under the treaty to “aim” to 
return their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.17 However 
 
 13. See infra notes 15-40 and accompanying text. See also Simone Schiele, Simplifying the 
Procedures Governing the Accession of a Party to Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, 2 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 418 (2008). 
 14. UNFCCC, supra note 3, Annex I. A second UNFCCC Annex, Annex II, lists a subset 
of industrialized nations which are expected to contribute financially to assist developing 
countries in reducing their emissions and in adapting to climate change. Id. Annex II. 
 15. Id. art. 4.1(a)-(b). 
 16. Id. pmbl. ¶ 6. 
 17. Id. art. 4.2(b). 
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hortatory that obligation may have been,18 the UNFCCC placed no 
comparable obligation on developing nations. 
While the UNFCCC bifurcated nations into two groups, and 
provided that nations could be added to Annex I through a 
cumbersome procedure amending that Annex,19 it also included an 
often-overlooked provision that made it relatively easy for nations to 
move from the non-Annex I Party group into the Annex I Party 
group. Article 4.2(g) of the UNFCCC provides: 
Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time 
thereafter, notify the Depositary that it intends to be bound by 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Depositary shall inform the 
other signatories and Parties of any such notification.20 
Although Article 4.2(g) of the UNFCCC facilitated relatively 
fluid movement from non-Annex I to Annex I Party status, the 1995 
Berlin Mandate and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 
deepened the UNFCCC split between industrialized and developing 
nations, and erected procedural hurdles that made it extremely 
difficult for new nations to adopt emissions caps.21 The Berlin 
Mandate launched a negotiation process aimed at setting, “for 
developed country/other Parties included in Annex I” of the 
UNFCCC, “quantified limitation and reduction objectives within 
specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol.”22 But, 
notably, the Berlin Mandate specified that this process would “[n]ot 
introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex 
I . . . .”23  So, while the UNFCCC in Article 3.1 specifically stated that 
“the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof,”24 and the Berlin 
 
 18. In the U.S. view, the obligation to “aim” to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 was 
hortatory, not binding, enabling the treaty to sail through the U.S. ratification process with the 
unanimous consent of the U.S. Senate. For more on the Resolution of Advice and Consent to 
the Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, see S. Exec. 
Rep. No. 102-55 (1992). 
 19. UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 16. 
 20. Id. art. 4.2(g). 
 21. See infra notes 22-40 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Berlin, F.R.G., Mar. 28-Apr. 7, 1995, Addendum, Decision 1/CP.1, § II(2)(b), 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (June 6, 1995) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 3.1. 
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Mandate sought to strengthen that lead through the adoption of 
emissions targets for developed countries, the Berlin Mandate did not 
require developing countries to follow the developed countries’ lead.  
It expressly exempted them from doing so.25 
Had the Berlin Mandate and the resulting Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change simply exempted developing countries from 
emissions caps, that would have created one array of problems. But in 
the run-up to the Kyoto talks in December 1997, developing countries 
argued that the “no new commitments” language of the Berlin 
Mandate also precluded any article in the new Kyoto accord that 
would allow nations voluntarily to cap emissions in order to join the 
carbon market.26 In late 1997 U.S. negotiators sought to introduce 
into the draft text of the Protocol a proposed “Article 10” that would 
have allowed developing nations voluntarily to adopt emissions caps.27 
The proposal was blocked by Saudi Arabia, China and India.28 
As if the demise of the proposed Article 10 were not enough, 
other provisions of the Protocol as adopted made it even more 
difficult for nations that voluntarily wished to cap emissions to join 
Kyoto’s carbon market.  Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol consists of a 
list of industrialized nations and their quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments.29 These are generally calculated by 
taking the percentage listed for each Party in Annex B and 
multiplying that by the emissions of the Party in the year 1990, and 
multiplying that by the number five, which is the number of years 
covered by the Kyoto Protocol’s commitments, i.e., 2008-2012.30 
However, Parties undergoing the transition to a market economy may 
select a base year or years other than 1990, and many did so.31 
Membership in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol is limited to 
Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC.32 Consequently, a new 
nation wishing to establish a commitment for itself under the Kyoto 
 
 25. Berlin Mandate, supra note 22. 
 26. Leonie Haimson, A History of Climate Change Negotiations, GRISTR MAG., Feb. 2004, 
http://www.climate-talks.net/2004-ENVRE130/PDF/20020731-Grist-History-of-Climate.pdf. 
 27. See, e.g., José Domingos Gonzalez Miguez, Brazil in Kyoto, ECON. & ENERGY, May-
June 1998, http://ecen.com/eee8/kioto98.htm. 
 28. Haimson, supra note 26. 
 29. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto 
Protocol Annex B, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 30. Id. arts. 3.1, 3.7. Emissions and removals associated with the Party’s forest lands are 
addressed under Articles 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7. 
 31. Id. art. 3.5, Annex B. 
 32. See id. art. 3.1; see also Schiele, supra note 13. 
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Protocol must first become a Party included in Annex I of the 
UNFCCC, either by obtaining an amendment to Annex I of the 
UNFCCC (which must then be ratified by the UNFCCC Parties in 
order to enter into force), or by making a notification under Article 
4(2)(g) of the UNFCCC.33 Then, once the new nation has become a 
Party included in Annex I of the UNFCCC, it must establish 1990 or 
another year or years as the base year(s) for its greenhouse gas 
emissions, and adopt a quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitment calculated in relation to that baseline.34 Its establishment 
of that commitment must be enshrined in an amendment of Annex B 
of the Kyoto Protocol, which in turn requires either a consensus of 
the Kyoto Protocol Parties or, (if consensus to amend was not 
forthcoming, approval by a “three-fourths majority vote of all the 
Parties present and voting at the meeting,” not just the Parties 
included in Annex B.35 Finally, the amendment of Annex B will only 
take effect for those Kyoto Protocol Parties that have ratified the 
amendment.36 All in all, not a way to welcome new entrants! 
C.  A Case Study on the Need for Docking Stations: Kazakhstan’s 
Experience 
The procedural roadblocks that hamper participation of new 
countries in the existing international climate treaty framework are 
illustrated vividly by the case of Kazakhstan. The Republic of 
Kazahstan, a non-Annex I nation, has been trying for over a decade 
to join the Kyoto Protocol with caps on its emissions. At the Fourth 
Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (COP-4) in Buenos Aires in November 1998, the 
government of Kazakhstan formally expressed interest in adopting 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol, and in utilizing the Protocol’s market mechanisms, in 
particular emissions trading, to provide new sources of capital for 
environmental protection.37 On April 24, 1999, the Government of 
Kazakhstan, through a note verbale, notified the Secretariat of the 
 
 33. See supra notes 20-21; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29, art. 1. 
 34. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29, arts. 3.1, 3.5, Annex B. 
 35. Id. arts. 20, 21. 
 36. See id. arts. 1(7), 20(4), 21(4); UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 4(2)(g); see also Schiele, 
supra note 13. 
 37. Schiele, supra note 13, at 421. 
PETSONK_FM T2.DOC 5/7/2009  4:25:33 PM  
442 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:433 
UNFCCC of its wish to join Annex I of the UNFCCC.38 On May 3, 
1999, the Secretariat communicated to the UNFCCC Parties the text 
of Kazakhstan’s note verbale.39 While the Parties to the UNFCCC 
had, in some cases, by decision changed the listing of Parties in Annex 
I,40 “the President of COP 5 conducted informal consultations on the 
proposal but was unable to achieve consensus” for accepting 
Kazakhstan’s proposal to join Annex I of the UNFCCC.41 
The next year, on March 23, 2000, “Kazakhstan by a note 
verbale . . . and in accordance with Article 4.2(g) [of the UNFCCC] 
notified the Depositary of the Convention that it intends to be bound 
by the provisions of Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention” – the 
provisions that obligate Parties to return emissions levels to 1990 by 
2000.42 On June 13, 2000, Kazakhstan sent notification to the 
Depositary of its intention to undertake voluntary quantitative 
commitments in accordance with Article 4.2(g).43 
By virtue of the notification and in accordance with Article 1, 
paragraph 7 of the Kyoto Protocol, Kazakhstan became a Party 
included in Annex I of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, for purposes of participation in the Kyoto Protocol.44 
Becoming a ‘Party included in Annex I’ was a necessary procedural 
step under Kyoto, even though by the time Kazakhstan did so, the 
core Annex I hortatory obligation under the UNFCCC, namely to 
aim to return national emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, was 
effectively moot. Consequently, the requirement that a nation 
become a ‘Party included in Annex I’ in order to participate in the 
Kyoto Protocol’s cap and trade mechanism became a mere formality 
 
 38. UNFCCC, Proposals to Amend the Lists in Annexes I and II of the Convention, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/proposal_to_amend_the_lists_in
_ annexes_1_and_2/items/3048.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Proposals to Amend 
the Lists]; see also Schiele, supra note 13 (citing Note from the Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations in N.Y., U.N. Doc. FCCCC/CP/1999/2 (Apr. 
1999)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Berlin Mandate, supra note 22, Decision 1/CP.1, § II(2)(b). 
 41. See UNFCCC, Issues in the Negotiating Process: Proposals to Amend the Lists in 
Annexes I and II of the Convention (June 4, 2002), http://unfccc.int/cop6/issues/110.html 
[hereinafter Issues in the Negotiating Process]. 
 42. Id.; see also Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Marrakesh, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its seventh session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/ADD.4, at 42 (Jan 21, 2002); and see Schiele, 
supra note 13, at 421. 
 43. Proposals to Amend the Lists, supra note 38. 
 44. Issues in the Negotiating Process, supra note 41. 
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– yet one more obstacle to the participation of new countries.  In 2006 
at COP 12 in Nairobi the 1992 base year for Kazakhstan was adopted 
by Conclusion.45 By letter dated November 3, 2008, Kazakhstan 
proposed a voluntary reduction commitment of 100% level of the 
base year emissions each year within the 2008-2012 period, based on 
its most recent GHG Inventory (2006).46 However, for Kazakhstan’s 
voluntary reduction commitment to result in an “Annex B” 
commitment within the Kyoto Protocol, such that Kazakhstan could 
have the possibility of undertaking emissions trading with other 
Annex I Parties, Kazakhstan may still have to seek an amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol, possibly including a ¾ majority vote to adopt the 
amendment; furthermore, the amendment will only enter into force 
for those nations that choose to ratify it, a process that could take 
many more years.47 
So, a full decade after it initiated the process of trying to join the 
Kyoto Protocol with a cap on emissions, Kazakhstan still has no clear 
timetable for joining the Kyoto Protocol’s cap and trade market, and 
therefore cannot gain access to significant financing for low-carbon 
development. The case of Kazakhstan illustrates sharply that many of 
the UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol roadblocks to participation serve no 
clear environmental or practical purpose. Instead they simply operate 
as legal barriers to the participation of new nations in a central goal of 
climate policy – namely, to engage as many nations as possible to cap 
and cut greenhouse gas emissions as quickly and efficiently as 
possible, and in so doing, spur as much innovation in low carbon 
technologies and practices as possible, worldwide. 
D.  A Historical Perspective on the Failure to Include Docking 
Stations in the Kyoto Protocol 
Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “The 
President . . . shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
 
 45. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Nairobi, Nov. 6-17, 2006, Information on the base year of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
FCCC/CP/2006/L.2 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://unfcc.int/resource/docs/2006/cop12/eng/ 
l02.pdf. 
 46. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1-12, 2008, Information on Voluntary Quantitative Commitments for 
Kazakhstan for the Period of 2008-2012, FCCC/CP/2008/5 (Nov. 25, 2008), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/cop14/eng/05.pdf. 
 47. See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text. 
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present concur . . . .”48 In the summer of 1997, during intense 
international negotiations on what was to become the Kyoto Protocol 
on Climate Change, the U.S. Senate advised President Clinton not to 
sign any climate protocol that failed to cap emissions of developing as 
well as industrialized nations.49 The Senate’s resolution, adopted by a 
vote of 95-0, stated: 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that— 
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, 
or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in 
December 1997, or thereafter, which would— 
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or 
other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 
Developing Country Parties within the same compliance 
period, or 
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United 
States; and 
(2) any such protocol or other agreement which would require the 
advice and consent of the Senate to ratification should be 
accompanied by a detailed explanation of any legislation or 
regulatory actions that may be required to implement the protocol 
or other agreement and should also be accompanied by an analysis 
of the detailed financial costs and other impacts on the economy of 
the United States which would be incurred by the implementation 
of the protocol or other agreement.50 
When the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol imposed legally 
binding emissions caps only on industrialized nations, and – in 
accordance with the Berlin Mandate - exempted developing countries 
from such caps,  the resulting architecture virtually guaranteed that 
the U.S. Senate would never give its consent to U.S. ratification of the 
Protocol. But the failure to include docking stations in the Protocol, 
and instead the inclusion of articles that raise formidable hurdles to 
the participation of new nations in Kyoto’s emissions caps, means that 
any new treaty drafted on the design template of Kyoto is highly 
unlikely to succeed either as a means of protecting the climate, or as a 
pathway for Congressional assent to a new international accord. 
 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 49. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. 143 CONG. REC. 8138 (1997) (enacted). 
 50. Id. 
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It is worth noting that in its bifurcation of industrialized versus 
developing nations, the Kyoto Protocol departed sharply from the 
preceding quarter century of environmental treaty-making. For 
example, the species protection obligations of the 1972 Washington 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) apply to all Parties, regardless of their level of 
development.51  Similarly, the strictures of the 1990 Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal apply equally to developing and industrialized 
nations.52 Another example is the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which offers a slightly 
different model. 
It too applies its control measures, i.e. those to freeze and phase 
out the production and consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals, in 
equal stringency  to industrialized and developing countries.53 But it 
gives developing countries (defined as those with less than 0.3 
kg/capita annual consumption of ozone-depleting substances (ODS)) 
a ten-year grace period to bring their measures into compliance.54  
Moreover, the ten-year grace period only allows developing countries 
to delay their compliance – it does not allow them to grow their 
baselines over the ten-year period of the delay.55 The Montreal 
Protocol’s equal application of measures to developing and 
industrialized countries was crucial to gaining its acceptance in 
 
 51. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27.2 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20993/volume-993-I-14537-English.pdf 
[hereinafter CITES]. 
 52. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal art. 4, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel 
Convention]. 
 53. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer arts. 2, 3, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
 54. The Montreal Protocol provides: 
Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of 
consumption of the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the 
date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter within ten 
years of the date of entry into force of the Protocol shall, in order to meet its basic 
domestic needs, be entitled to delay its compliance with the control measures set out in 
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2 by ten years after that specified in those paragraphs. 
However, such Party shall not exceed an annual calculated level of consumption of 0.3 
kilograms per capita. Any such Party shall be entitled to use either the average of its 
annual calculated level of consumption for the period 1995 to 1997 inclusive or a 
calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita, whichever is the lower, as 
the basis for its compliance with the control measures. 
 Id. art. 5. 
 55. See id. 
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parliaments and congresses in the latter grouping. Without such 
provisions, it is possible that the ODS-producing industries in 
industrialized countries would have urged their legislators to oppose 
ratification of the Protocol, on the ground that giving developing 
country industries a “free pass” to produce as much ODS as they 
wished would have vitiated the Protocol’s effectiveness and handed 
the developing country industries an unfair competitive advantage. In 
fact, the Protocol’s entry-into-force provisions, which provide that the 
Protocol did not enter into force until 11 nations representing 2/3 of 
global consumption of ODS had ratified it,56 and its ban on trade in 
ODS with non-Parties (which also applied to developing country 
exporters of ODS),57 were put in place to ensure that there would be 
strong market pressure on major non-party developing country 
producers to participate in the Protocol.58 
To the extent that prior treaty practice serves as a cautionary tale 
for the fate of a new Copenhagen agreement in the U.S. Congress, 
the lesson is crystal clear: If the nations of the world are to agree on 
effective frameworks that engage the United States in the effort to avert 
dangerous climate change, the Copenhagen accord must do better at 
welcoming new nations to dock into the global effort to cap and cut 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
 
 56. Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Montreal Protocol provides: 
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on 1 January 1989, provided that at least eleven 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval of the Protocol or accession thereto 
have been deposited by States or regional economic integration organizations 
representing at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption of the controlled 
substances, and the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Convention have 
been fulfilled. In the event that these conditions have not been fulfilled by that date, 
the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which the 
conditions have been fulfilled. 
Id. art. 16(1). 
 57. Article 4 of the Protocol provides, in part, 
Control of Trade with Non-Parties. 
1. Within one year of the entry into force of this Protocol, each Party shall ban the 
import of controlled substances from any State not party to this Protocol. 
2. Beginning on 1 January 1993, no Party operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 may 
export any controlled substance to any State not party to this Protocol. 
 Id. art. 4. 
 58. See Carol Annette Petsonk, The Role of The United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
351, 370 (1990). 
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II. ‘DOCKING STATIONS:’ DESIGNING A MORE 
WELCOMING ARCHITECTURE FOR A POST-2012 
FRAMEWORK TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE 
The concept which is embodied in the Byrd-Hagel resolution is that 
developing country parties should join the developed world in 
making new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions within the same compliance period. Now, 
does this mean that the Senate is insisting on commitments to 
identical levels of emissions among all the parties? Certainly not. 
The emissions limitations goals, to be fair, should be based on a 
country’s level of development. The purpose is not to choke off 
Mexico’s development or China’s development. The purpose is to 
start addressing the greenhouse gas problem in the only meaningful 
way we can, that is, through globally and through binding 
commitments up front. The timeframe could be 5 years, 7 years, 10 
years or whatever. The initial commitment to action, starting upon 
signature in Kyoto, could be relatively modest, pacing upwards 
depending upon various factors, with a specific goal to be achieved 
within a fixed time period. There are plenty of tools to encourage 
the developing world to make meaningful commitments. 
 
-Senator Robert C. Byrd, floor debate on S. Res. 98, the Byrd-
Hagel Resolution, 25 July 1997. 
 
Carbon markets, carefully designed, constitute one very 
important set of tools to encourage meaningful commitments by 
major developing country emitters.  Part II of this paper provides 
substantive and procedural recommendations for how docking 
stations might be included in a Copenhagen agreement and in U.S. 
cap-and-trade legislation.  It then briefly surveys docking stations in 
other international market-based agreements, and concludes with 
thoughts on docking stations and the Advice & Consent clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
A. Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Docking Stations in Post-
2012 International Climate Change Frameworks 
To create docking stations in a new Copenhagen climate 
agreement, what minimum substantive and procedural elements 
would be needed to ensure the environmental integrity of the 
agreement as well as the rapid participation of new nations?  
Substantively, docking stations need to welcome new nations into the 
system of benefits and obligations created by the new agreement. As 
will be discussed more fully below, the agreement will need to create 
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docking stations that welcome new nations – especially major-
emitting economies – into cap and trade markets, offering those 
nations benefits beyond what they can expect from Kyoto’s current 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provided that those nations 
accept the responsibilities of measuring, monitoring, reporting, 
capping, and enforcing reductions in national greenhouse gas 
emissions. A docking station should also be included enabling nations 
to access assistance for adapting to climate change. Procedurally, 
docking stations need to establish rapid and transparent processes by 
which new nations can join the agreement. These procedures should 
be perceived as fair by those nations utilizing them, by those nations 
already participating in carbon markets. The following sections 
address the substantive aspects of docking stations, followed by the 
procedural aspects of those docking stations.59 
1.  Three substantive types of Docking Stations 
At least three substantive types of docking stations can be 
envisioned for inclusion in the Copenhagen agreement: a national 
docking station, a sectoral docking station, and an adaptation docking 
station.60 A national docking station would be a provision in the new 
agreement that would welcome the participation, in the new 
agreement’s carbon market, of any nation willing to cap its total 
national emissions, or a great majority of its national emissions, for at 
least two consecutive five-year periods, or preferably three 
consecutive five-year periods.61 The cap would be set using the same 
 
 59. These recommendations remain regardless whether the international negotiations 
proceed in both the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Dialogue on Long-Term Cooperative 
Action (AWG/LCA) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
and in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol (AWG/KP), which groups may be 
merged in a future round of negotiations. 
 60. For proposals suggesting some aspects of docking stations consonant to some extent 
with this section, see, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, A BLUEPRINT FOR 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 9 (2009), available at http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf 
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT]; Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading System of the Community, at 10, COM (2008) 16 final (Jan. 23, 
2008). 
 61. The choice of five years for a commitment period is to some extent arbitrary. The same 
approach would work with at least two successive seven-year periods, for example. What is 
crucial is to ensure that (a) commitment periods are of sufficient duration so as to be effective in 
addressing national or sectoral emissions; (b) that successive commitment periods extend far 
enough into the future to send a clear signal to market actors that mandatory limitations on 
emissions will govern their activities over the duration of capital stock planning horizons; and 
(c) multi-year commitment periods offer governments tools for enforcement based on the 
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general approach as that in Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol, namely 
the cap would be established as a multi-year emissions budget, in 
relation to a historical base year or years with known emissions.62 
Nations could be given flexibility to select their base year(s), as was 
done for nations undergoing the transition to a market economy in 
the Kyoto Protocol.63 If a nation’s cap covered less than its entire 
national emissions profile, its cap would need to be paired with 
complementary measures to address its uncapped sectors.64 
In exchange for shouldering the responsibilities associated with 
measuring, monitoring, reporting, implementing, and enforcing a cap 
on its total emissions, each nation utilizing this docking station would 
be afforded full access to the emissions cap and trade market created 
by the new agreement.  That is, the nation’s emissions allowances 
would be afforded full recognition in the cap and trade market, 
enabling the nation to leapfrog the burdensome project-by-project 
approach of the CDM.65 
 
settled expectations of market participants that they will, in fact, be held accountable for 
meeting emissions limits. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 62. Although nations utilizing this docking station will surely take into account projections 
of their future emissions when selecting their base year and cap level, the legal mechanism for 
the docking station would require that caps be calculated as a mathematical product of one or 
more historical base years’ emissions, as is currently done under Kyoto’s Article 3.1, and not 
established as a function of a Business-as-Usual (BaU) projection of national emissions. That is 
because, as Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism has demonstrated, basing a target on a 
calculation of BaU necessarily gives rise to a perverse incentive to inflate BaU, and leads to 
dueling projections of BaU that then must be continually revised in light of actual experience. 
More fundamentally, if the goal of a Copenhagen agreement is to drive global emissions 
downward, and if emissions in the developing world are rising rapidly on BaU, then it is not 
possible to achieve the global emissions-decline goal if the CDM is the only mechanism for 
engaging the developing world, even if industrialized countries’ emissions caps are set at zero. 
The CDM simply transfers reductions-below-BaU from developing to industrialized countries, 
and allows the latter’s emissions to increase by the amount of the transfer.  See Kyoto Protocol 
Article 3.12. Therefore, as long as developing countries’ emissions are rising rapidly, the CDM 
does not drive global emissions downward. See, e.g., Kyle Meng, Creating a Cleaner CDM, 
CARBON FIN., Sept. 2007, at 16-17. It is vital that these problems not be imported into a 
Copenhagen agreement. 
 63. See supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text. 
 64. In the case of large-emitting nations proposing to dock in gradually, beginning with 
caps on total emissions of some but not all of their political sub-units, Parties might wish to 
consider allowing phased dock-in, provided the initial sub-national caps cover a substantial 
majority of national emissions, and taking into account the possibility of intra-national leakage. 
 65. For a discussion of some of the problems of the CDM, see U.S. GAO, International 
Climate Change Programs:  Lessons Learned from the European Union’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (GAO-09-151 Nov. 2008), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09151.pdf. 
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Nations accessing the carbon market via this docking station 
would need to demonstrate their commitment to enforcing national 
legislation to meet their emissions limits.  Some form of “seller 
liability” provisions, in which end-of-commitment-period emissions in 
excess of a national cap are subtracted automatically from a 
successive commitment period, with an atmospheric penalty, as is the 
case under the Marrakesh Accords implementing the Kyoto Protocol, 
would need to be included in the national legislation.66 
To encourage new nations, including fast-developing nations, to 
move swiftly to utilize the national docking station and cap their total 
emissions, this docking station might offer several incentives. 
First, it might afford the docking nation access to a portion of its 
carbon emissions budget on an “early action” basis, such that, upon 
initiating the procedure to dock in via this docking station (see 
below), new nations might be afforded the ability to forward-sell or 
forward-pledge portions of their emissions budgets as a means of 
financing low carbon emissions budgets. 
Second, the docking nations might be offered the opportunity to 
establish a multi-year emissions budget set above a nation’s current 
emissions but within economic and environmental constraints.  
Through this mechanism, the docking station could offer nations 
access carbon finance immediately and far more efficiently than 
existing and proposed mechanisms. The growth increment – the 
portion of the emissions budget in excess of the nation’s actual 
emissions – would provide a pool of emissions allowances that could 
be leveraged in carbon markets to deliver immediately available 
financing for low-carbon development.  The “early action” and 
“growth budget” approaches are precisely the approaches the 
 
 66. While these may not be explicitly mentioned in the design of this docking station, it is 
also possible that some nations may multilaterally or unilaterally adopt further enforcement 
provisions such as “buyer liability” provisions, in which allowances purchased from non-
complying nations would be automatically discounted. See Robert O. Keohane & Kal Raustiala, 
Toward a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Architecture: A Political Analysis (Discussion Paper 08-
01, Harvard Project on Int’l Climate Agreements, July 2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg. 
harvard.edu/files/Keohane%20and%20Raustiala%20HPICA1.pdf; see also  OECD Envt. 
Directorate & Int’l Energy Agency, An assessment of liability rules for international GHG 
emissions trading:  Information paper, at 6, COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT (2000), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2000/ghget.pdf. An additional enforcement mechanism that 
nations might adopt multilaterally or unilaterally is the so-called “border carbon adjustment,” 
i.e., a requirement that carbon-intensive products imported into nations complying with caps on 
emissions from nations without emissions caps, or where enforcement of national caps has not 
occurred, be accompanied by emissions allowances sufficient to cover the emissions incurred 
when the product was produced in the uncapped country. See, e.g., Podesta, supra note 7, at 5. 
PETSONK_FM T2.DOC 5/7/2009  4:25:33 PM  
2009] DOCKING STATIONS TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE 451 
European Union has decided to take in extending the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) for the period 2013-
2020. The EU is  creating a “solidarity mechanism” to help less 
affluent EU member states with the transition to a low-carbon 
economy: they will receive an increased amount of emissions permits 
to auction, i.e. 12 % more than their actual share in overall EU GHG 
emissions, which will give them an opportunity of generating 
substantial revenues from selling allowances.67 
Third, the national docking station might offer new nations 
technical assistance and capacity building, to facilitate their rapid, 
transparent and effective participation in carbon markets, including 
their utilization of carbon market finance for low-carbon 
development. 
A sectoral docking station would be appropriate for nations 
adopting binding targets on total emissions from particular sectors, 
including the forest sector. Under this approach, developing nations 
that wish to dock in to a docking station one or more  particular 
sectors, would commit to undertake a national program for at least 
two consecutive five-year periods, or preferably three consecutive 
five-year periods, limiting emissions in those sectors.68 Key elements 
of the sectoral docking station would include requirements that the 
targets be legally binding, i.e., domestically enforceable; that they 
cover a substantial portion (probably 50%) of the nation’s emissions; 
that they be paired with complementary measures to address 
uncapped sectors; that they cover total emissions, not so-called 
“intensity targets” or limits on emissions per unit of economic output; 
that they address in-country leakage between capped and uncapped 
sectors; and that they be accompanied by a national commitment to 
domestic enforcement. In exchange for shouldering the 
responsibilities associated with measuring, monitoring, reporting, 
implementing, and enforcing caps on total emissions of large-emitting 
sectors, and adopting complementary measures addressing emissions 
in uncapped sectors, each nation utilizing this docking station would 
 
 67. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council adopts climate-energy 
legislative package, 8434/09 (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/107136.pdf. See also Gernot Wagner, Nathaniel 
Keohane, Annie Petsonk, & James Wang, Docking into a Global Carbon Market: Clean 
Investment Budgets to Finance Low-Carbon Economic Development, in THE ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (forthcoming 2009). 
 68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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be afforded full privileges in the cap and trade market with regard to 
emissions from the capped sector. 
One sectoral example that merits particular attention is that of 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries 
(REDD). Creating a REDD Docking Station would enable any 
nation that reduces total national emissions from deforestation below 
a historical average set of base years to trade reductions below that 
historical base period.69 Given the urgency of addressing REDD, new 
nations that move swiftly to utilize the sectoral docking station might 
be granted access to their forest carbon emissions budget on an “early 
action” basis, whereby, upon initiating the docking procedure (see 
below), new nations might be afforded the ability to forward-sell or 
forward-pledge portions of their REDD emissions budgets as a 
means of financing low carbon emissions budgets. President Lula of 
Brazil has recently proposed that Brazil reduce emissions from 
deforestation 70% over the next decade, as measured from a 
historical baseline of the previous ten-year average.70 While Brazil has 
not proposed that such reductions be creditable in carbon markets, 
the proposal helps illustrate elements of how such a docking station 
could be constructed. 
The Parties to the Copenhagen agreement might wish to create a 
special type of docking station, an adaptation docking station for very 
low-emitting nations that wish to access adaptation funding. A variety 
of options for generating adaptation funds needs to be explored post-
haste. These options are beyond the scope of the current article.  
However, a few basic elements of this docking station should be 
mentioned here. Nations wishing to utilize the adaptation docking 
station would need to demonstrate minimum levels of transparency 
for tracking funds, to ensure that funds are used for adaptation 
projects as stated. The adaptation docking station might reasonably 
offer nations technical assistance to enable them to include, whenever 
possible, mitigation components in their adaptation activities, to 
ensure that adaptation programs do not actually make the climate 
crisis worse, and to enable emission reductions to finance as much 
adaptation activity as possible. 
 
 69. See Márcio Santilli et al., Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol, 71 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 267, 269-71 (2005) (setting forth the first proposal for this type of approach). 
 70. See Joshua Partlow, Brazil's Decision on Deforestation Draws Praise, WASH. POST 
FOREIGN SERVICE, Dec. 6, 2008, at A09. 
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2.  Prohibition on some kinds of docking stations. 
To maintain the integrity of the docking station framework, it 
would be essential to prohibit docking for certain nations in certain 
circumstances. First, docking stations should not be opened for any 
high-emission nation, whether an industrialized economy or an 
emerging economy, to dock into the carbon market solely by earning 
credits for projects that reduce emissions below business-as-usual, by 
reducing the greenhouse “intensity” of its economy (emissions per 
unit of economic output), or by committing to use particular 
technologies or policies, without adopting a cap on a significant share 
of its total national emissions. The world has run out of time for these 
alternatives. Atmospheric modeling indicates that if nations are 
serious about averting more than 2 degrees of warming, there is no 
ambit for such crediting beyond roughly 2017, at least as concerns 
major emitting nations, whether in the form of CDM under the Kyoto 
Protocol, intensity targets, or otherwise.71 
Second, no nation should be permitted to dock into the carbon 
market created by the new agreement if it has adopted a cost-
containment provision whereby, if the price of traded allowances 
reaches a specified level in its market, it simply begins printing new, 
cap-busting allowances for sale at the specified price. That would 
vitiate the integrity of the nation’s cap and by extension, the global 
framework. Third, anti-circumvention clauses should be utilized. To 
maintain the integrity of the global framework, nations that allow 
their domestic systems to link to nations whose programs would be 
prohibited from docking into the international framework should also 
be prohibited from docking in. 
To enable nations to dock into cap-and-trade markets rapidly 
without undermining the environmental integrity of those markets, 
certain core elements must be included, while elements that are 
antithetical to the environmental and/or economic integrity of the 




 71. See Climate Change—International Issues, Engaging Developing Countries: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. On Energy & Air Quality of the H. Comm. On Energy & Commerce, 
110th Cong. 6, 11-12 (2007) (statement of Annie Petsonk, Int’l Counsel, Envtl. Def.), available 
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-eaq-hrg.032707.Petsonk-testimony.pdf 
[hereinafter Petsonk Testimony]. 
 72. See infra tbl 1. 
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 Table 1.  Essential elements common to market-based docking stations.73   
Element Essential  Antithetical  
Cap on total or 
sectoral  emissions 
Successive multi-year emissions 
budgets, expressed as multiple 
of historical base years; budgets 
extending for at least three 5-
year budget periods.  Cf. KP 
Article 3.1. 
No intensity or technolgy targets, 
no cap-busting safety valves, no 
emissions budgets based on 
projections of Business-as-Usual.  
If sectoral, cap must cover total 
emissions of a substantial share of 




Annual emissions reporting 
(see KP Articles 5, 7 and 8), 
incl. from deforestation  
Conflicts of interest among rule-
writing, measurement, and 
reporting agencies must be barred 
Transparent 
transaction tracking 
Allowances must be uniquely 
vintaged; all transfers recorded 
in publicly accessible registries.  
No discrimination among types of 
allowances – a ton is a ton.  
Fungibility among 
allowances 
Allowance transfers get added 
to recipient’s budget and 
subtracted from transferor’s.  
See Kyoto Protocol Articles 
3.10, and 3.11, and 3.12.   
For nations that dock in to the 
carbon market on the basis of 
forward-transfers of future 
emissions allowances, there must 
be a mechanism for accounting for 
(subtracting) these allowances 
from their national emissions 
budget. 
No crediting of 
reductions below BaU 
in large emitting 
uncapped countries  
Caps in major emitting nations 
must cover majority of national 
emissions 
No crediting project-based 
reductions in major economies 
unless (a) en route to a national 
cap, or (b) limited to a small share 
of the economy 
Accountability –
legally binding cap 
National commitment to 
enforce cap via national 
legislation.  “Seller liability” 
essential; “buyer liability” 
possible.  Border carbon 
adjustments to address national 
leakage may be utilized.   
For major emitting nations 
voluntary sectoral “no-lose” 
targets should not be eligible for 
docking in to carbon markets.   
Durability and 
consistency  
Government should establish 
multi-year emissions caps that 
cover several (three?) multi-
year periods, with periodic 
scientific reviews 
No arbitrary changes to caps or 
rules, except as provided for in 
advance through rules.   
Independent rating 
agencies & market 
oversight authority 
There is no KP antecedent Conflicts of interest among rating 
entities must be barred 
 
 
 73. This table is based on work of Daniel J. Dudek as exemplified in a report prepared for 
the 1998 Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on Market Mechanisms (a project of the German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and the Envtl. Def. 
Fund). See generally ANNIE PETSONK, DANIEL J. DUDEK & JOSEPH GOFFMAN, ENVTL. DEF. 
FUND, MARKET MECHANISMS & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS (1998), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_repo 
rts/market_mechanisms. 
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B.  Procedural aspects of docking stations 
1.  Outline of procedures. 
To create the docking stations, UNFCCC Parties negotiating a 
new Copenhagen Agreement could include in that accord the 
following legal elements. First, the Parties might include a set of 
provisions common to all docking stations. These would reaffirm each 
docking country’s commitment to Article 2 of the UNFCCC. Next, 
the Parties might develop provisions specifying the rights and 
obligations associated with each of the three types of docking stations 
discussed above. Articles establishing the national docking station 
would specify that any nation or group of nations74 may dock into the 
Copenhagen Agreement’s carbon market at any time within a 
specified period following the Protocol’s adoption, provided that the 
nation submits to the Agreetments Depositary of national legislation 
enacting legally binding caps covering a specified percentage of its 
total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions for a specified period 
of years, and limiting its net anthropogenic emissions during those 
years to a level calculated by multiplying its emissions during a 
historical base year or years selected by it, by a specified percentage, 
and by the number of years covered by its commitment. These articles 
would also specify a minimum number of years to be covered by this 
multi-year commitment, with the commitment spanning at least two 
consecutive multi-year emissions budget periods.75 
 
 74. The Kyoto Protocol allows nations to take commitments jointly, a useful provision that 
encourages nations to work together to meet what might be more ambitious emissions limits 
than would otherwise be possible if each nation were required to act alone. Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 29, art. 4. The Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer includes similar “industrial 
rationalization” provisions encouraging joint efforts to phase out ozone-depleting substances 
faster, and more cost-effectively, than if each nation acted alone. Montreal Protocol, supra note 
53, arts. 1(8), 2. 
 75. For example, the articles could specify that in order to dock in via the national docking 
station, a nation would need to enact national legislation capping A% of its national 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, such caps taking effect in the years B through C, and 
limiting its national net anthropogenic emissions to the product of (B-C) times D% in years E-
F, and such caps further taking effect in years (B+[B-C]) through (C+[B-C]), and limiting its 
national net anthropogenic emissions to the product of (B-C) times G% of its national 
emissions in years E-F. In this example: A is the percentage of national emissions to be covered 
by the cap. Parties might negotiate an agreement that in order to use this docking station, A 
must be greater than or equal to a majority share of national emissions, e.g. 70%. B is the first 
year of operation of the docking Party’s commitment. For industrialized countries, the Parties 
might negotiate that B would be equal to not more than two or three years after the date of 
adoption of the Copenhagen accord. For emerging economies, the Parties might negotiate that 
B would be not more than five years later than industrialized countries’ first year of operation. 
C is the last year of operation of the first commitment period of the docking Party’s 
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For the Sectoral Docking Station, including the REDD Docking 
Station, similar approaches to the national docking station could 
readily be constructed. For the Adaptation Docking Station, rather 
than defining commitment obligations in terms of emissions 
limitations, nations docking into the agreement for assistance on 
adaptation would need to deposit with the secretariat indicia of 
commitments to transparency. 
2. Docking stations in other international market-based 
frameworks. 
Legal precedent for docking into markets can be found in a 
range of international and domestic market-based frameworks. The 
three major market-oriented environmental treaties76 – the Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, and the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) - all have 
accession provisions that can be thought of generically as docking 
stations, providing a much more flexible means of expanding their 
participation than the cumbersome provisions of the UNFCCC-
Kyoto Protocol framework.77 For example, to join the Montreal 
Protocol on the Ozone Layer, a nation need only ratify the Protocol 
 
commitment. The selection of C determines the length of the multi-year emissions budget 
period over which the commitment applies.  If the Kyoto Protocol’s design template were 
followed, C would be equal to B + 5.  D is the percentage limit applied to the commitment 
period.  Under the Kyoto Protocol, some nations adopted “D” set at less than 100% of their 
base period emissions, while others, e.g. Australia, adopted “D” set at greater than 100% of 
their base period emissions. The selection of “D” by each nation, and its acceptance by other 
nations, provides a core means of differentiating the common responsibility to limit emissions, 
and a means of welcoming new nations into the agreement. E-F represent the emissions base 
year or years against which emissions limitations are calculated. While many nations in the 
Kyoto Protocol chose 1990 as their single emissions base year, nations undergoing the transition 
to a market economy were permitted, in Kyoto, to select different historical base years, 
including an average of historical base years, provided that the years they selected were in fact 
historical. The selection of E-F provides another core means of differentiating the common 
responsibility to limit emissions and a further means of welcoming new nations into the 
agreement.  For reasons described above, however, it is vital that E-F be historical rather than 
future years. The same basic formula can be used to define a second multi-year commitment 
period. In the example above, G represents the percentage limit applied to the second 
commitment period, and again serves as a means of differentiating commitments in future years. 
 76. The treaties can be considered in some respects as being market-based in that they 
each create limited permits to trade in particular environmentally sensitive products – ozone-
depleting substances, hazardous wastes, and endangered species, respectively. See generally 
Annie Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the 
Development of International Environmental Law, 5 AM U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 351 (1990). 
 77. See infra notes 13-46 and accompanying text. 
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and immediately apply all of the obligations to which existing 
members are subject.78 The same is true of the Basel Convention on 
the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and CITES.79 
Like the problems of ozone layer protection, hazardous waste 
control, and species protection, global warming is a problem whose 
solution set is enhanced by broader participation, particularly of 
major emitters.80 Moreover, because global warming is accelerating 
rapidly, such that there is a strong incentive for nations to find ways 
to encourage one another to move extremely swiftly to join 
frameworks for controlling greenhouse gas emissions, docking 
stations with not just incentives, but expedited procedures for new 
participants, are worth considering. One important place to look for 
analogies in international law is the set of legal mechanisms by which 
nations can “dock into” or accede to an international market-based 
framework is the accession provisions of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).81 
 
 78. The Montreal Protocol, supra note 53, provides in Article 16(3) and Article 17: 
Article 16(3). After the entry into force of this Protocol, any State or regional 
economic integration organization shall become a Party to it on the ninetieth day 
following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession. 
Article 17. Parties Joining after Entry into Force. Subject to Article 5 [developing 
countries’ 10-year grace period], any State or regional economic integration 
organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol after the date of its entry into 
force, shall fulfil forthwith the sum of the obligations under Article 2 [phase-out of 
ozone-depleting substances], as well as under Article 4 [restrictions on trade in ODS 
with non-Parties], that apply at that date to the States and regional economic 
integration organizations that became Parties on the date the Protocol entered into 
force. 
 79. Basel Convention, supra note 52, art. 22; CITES, supra note 51, arts. XX, XXI. 
 80. Arguably, adding new nations to these treaties does not disturb or dilute the interests 
of nations that are already Parties to the treaties. The case of climate change is fundamentally 
different. Because there is a limited amount of “space” in the atmosphere for greenhouse gas 
emissions consistent with averting dangerous climate change, all nations have an interest in the 
terms upon which any one country participates in an international climate framework, and all 
nations can be affected if any major emitting nation or bloc refuses to take on emission 
reduction obligations. Hence, all Parties have strong interests in reviewing closely the terms 
upon which new nations may join; and all Parties have strong interests in imposing 
consequences on those who refuse to participate. 
 81. Article XII, entitled “Accession.”, reads: 
1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of 
its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on 
terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial 
Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds 
majority of the Members of the WTO. 
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Generally, accession to the WTO is a fairly cumbersome process 
under which, once a nation submits a letter of intent to accede to the 
WTO, a Working Party is established to work with any incoming 
nation over a period of years to assist the nation in preparing its trade 
laws and policies to meet the requirements of WTO participation, and 
the precise terms are negotiated among all the other WTO members 
in a lengthy series of bilateral accession deals. That is, any nation may 
become a member (“accede to”) the WTO, but two-thirds of all WTO 
members must agree on the terms.82 However, in December 2002, as 
part of its development agenda, the WTO General Council approved 
new guidelines streamlining WTO accession procedures for least-
developed countries (LDCs).83 “The simplified and accelerated 
accession procedures aim to assist in integrating LDCs into the global 
economy, which was identified as a principal objective at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in November 2001. . . . The guidelines, which 
will come into effect immediately, focus on the areas of market 
access, WTO rules, process and trade-related technical assistance and 
capacity building. They exempt LDCs from making excessive 
concessions or commitments with regard to market access, grant 
transitional periods and arrangements with regard to WTO rules, and 
provide for support and technical assistance both with regard to the 
accession process and general integration into the multilateral trading 
system.”84 
 The guidelines merit close examination: they contain a number 
of parallels to the kinds of provisions that may be useful if nations are 
to create docking stations in a new international framework to be 
adopted in Copenhagen in 2009 or in national legislation to welcome 
new nations, including and especially developing nations, into the 
collective effort to cap and cut greenhouse gas emissions. Among 
other provisions, the guidelines offer transitional periods/transitional 
arrangements to enable acceding nations to effectively implement 
commitments and obligations, taking into account individual 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XII, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154. 
 82. See WTO, Membership, Alliances and Bureaucracy, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm. 
 83. Sub-Comm. on Least Developed Countries, Communication to the General Council: 
Accession of Least Developed Countries, WT/COMTD/LDC/12 (Dec. 5 2002). 
 84. ‘Development’ Round In The Balance At WTO General Council, TNC Meetings, 
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Dec. 12, 2002, at 1, 2, available at http://ictsd.net/ 
i/news/bridgesweekly/7068/. 
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development, financial and trade needs; and Action Plans for 
compliance with WTO rules, supported by technical assistance and 
capacity building measures for the acceding nations.85 The available 
literature seems to indicate pluses and minuses for the procedures 
overall.86 A ‘lessons learned’ compendium might be useful for the 
trade and environmental community to undertake together. 87 
 
3.  The usefulness of Notice of Intent and Working Party 
procedures 
In the meantime, looking over docking stations in both the 
multilateral environmental agreements and the WTO, two useful 
procedural elements that might be considered for inclusion in a 
Copenhagen agreement are notices of intent to join the new 
agreement, and the convening of working parties to assist new nations 
in joining. Specifically, articles could be included in the Copenhagen 
agreement requiring that any notice of intent to dock into the 
Copenhagen agreements carbon market, from any nation or group of 
nations, be accompanied by (a) an Action Plan for compliance with 
the requirements of the agreement associated with that Docking 
station, or (b) a request to convene a Working Party to assist the 
nation or group of nations with preparation of the Action Plan. The 
implementation of the Action Plans could be supported by Technical 
 
 85. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 86. See, e.g., Samnang Chea & Hach Sok, Cambodia’s Accession to the WTO: ‘Fast Track’ 
Accession by a Least Developed Country, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO 
PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES 120 (World Trade Organization ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2005) available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case8_e.htm 
(indicating that WTO conditions of membership may be too onerous for Cambodia with too 
little reward, but that on the other hand WTO membership would force Cambodia to institute 
important reforms). 
 87. In fact, those interested in designing cap-and-trade components of a climate treaty 
framework in order to attract the participation of new nations might do well to consider a range 
of elements of the WTO framework as analogies. The WTO has been able to attract the 
participation of a wide range of nations precisely because it is a system of reciprocal obligations 
and privileges, in which nation agree to subject themselves to WTO disciplines in order to gain 
the benefits of market access. An analogous framework can be considered in the climate 
context, where nations adopt the disciplines of emissions caps, monitoring, verification, and 
enforcement, in order to gain the benefits of carbon market access. A full exploration of this 
subject, however, is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Annie Petsonk, The Kyoto 
Protocol and the WTO: Integrating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Into the 
Global Marketplace, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185 (1999); see also Petsonk Testimony, 
supra note 71. 
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Assistance and Capacity Building measures for the acceding nation or 
nations. 
Upon the request of an acceding nation or nations, Copenhagen 
Parties could coordinate their various efforts with each other and with 
relevant multilateral, regional and bilateral development partners to 
guide the new nation through the accession and implementation 
process. The provisions could specify that effective and broad-based 
technical cooperation and capacity building measures shall be 
provided, on a priority basis, to cover all stages of the accession 
process, i.e. from the preparation of documentation to the setting up 
of the legislative infrastructure and enforcement mechanisms, to 
enable the acceding nations to benefit from and comply with their 
rights and obligations under the Copenhagen accord.  Provisions 
could also recognize that UNFCCC Parties could facilitate the 
accession process by holding bilateral talks with the acceding nations 
if so requested. In addition, the Parties could decide to make use of 
the offices of the UNFCCC Secretariat available to assist acceding 
nations and Chairpersons of Accession Working Parties. 
Such provisions could enable new nations to begin to trade in 
carbon markets even while their national emissions monitoring and 
measurement systems are being finalized, as long as certain 
restrictions (e.g. requiring nations to hold the bulk of their emissions 
allowances in reserve for the future) are included. This type of 
approach could be crucial in welcoming new nations to dock into the 
Copenhagen accord rapidly, even while they are finalizing their 
national infrastructure for implementing their emission reduction 
commitments. Such early participation could invite concomitantly 
rapid investment in low-carbon energy technologies particularly in 
fast-growing emerging economies, where waiting to allow trading 
until their national infrastructure is complete risks locking in another 
five or ten years of carbon-intensive economic development. This 
participation would represent a fundamentally different approach, 
welcoming new nations, rather than erecting the kinds of 
participation hurdles that have so hampered new participation in the 
Kyoto Protocol framework. 
Crucially, Working Parties could be tasked, among other 
responsibilities, with evaluating the extent to which the accession 
targets proposed by a new nation or group of nations would assist the 
Parties in meeting the overall objective of the UNFCCC. The 
Working Parties would need to communicate closely with new 
nations, with one another, and with the Intergovernmental Panel on 
PETSONK_FM T2.DOC 5/7/2009  4:25:33 PM  
2009] DOCKING STATIONS TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE 461 
Climate Change (IPCC) and other scientific authorities, to ensure 
that accessions did not oversubscribe the available atmospheric space 
consistent with the goal of averting dangerous climate change. 
Effectively, however, such a procedure would establish a first-
come, first-served approach to the remaining atmospheric space, 
putting a significant premium on early action by new nations to dock 
into the Copenhagen carbon market as soon as possible. In fact, such 
an approach could be utilized whether under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC or a smaller grouping of nations, although which nations 
might be included in that grouping is a matter of considerable 
debate.88 
4.  The possible relevance of trade-with-non-Parties provisions 
Docking stations, whether in a multilateral context or in the 
context of national legislation enabling bilateral congressional-
executive agreements, must still confront the question of 
enforcement, namely whether to close the docking station for nations 
that fail to comply with its terms. While those who fail to comply or 
otherwise refuse to participate in an environmental treaty or other 
collective arrangement to achieve a public good are sometimes called 
“free riders” (because as non-compliers or non-participants they are 
able to enjoy, for free, the benefits of the collective arrangement even 
without subscribing to them), in some instances nations that refuse to 
join in collective efforts to protect the environment are not “free 
riders,” but rather “lone rangers” – they have the ability, acting 
individually or collectively, to prevent all participants from sharing 
the benefits of treaty participation. In such cases, where an outlier has 
the potential, through its actions, to deprive all others of the benefit 
of the arrangement, nations have a collective interest in establishing 
very stringent consequences for “lone rangers”. 
 
 88. See, e.g., Todd Stern & William Antholis, A Changing Climate: The Road Ahead for the 
United States, WASH. Q.,  Winter 2007-08, at 175, 180 (calling for the creation of an E8); Todd 
Stern, Global Warming Requires Global Leadership (June 1, 2007), http://www.americanpr 
ogress.org/issues/2007/06/G8_global_warming.html (“[An E8 would be] a small group of leaders 
from the United States, the European Union, Japan, Russia, China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa with the aim of short-circuiting bureaucratic logjams and producing concrete results. An 
E8 would propel leaders to get personally involved in creating an ecological board of directors 
that would operate outside the bureaucracy and politics of large UN conventions.”). But 
compare David Weisbach, Responsibility for Climate Change, By the Numbers, 18-22 (AEI Ctr. 
for Regulatory and Mkt. Studies, Working Paper No. 09-04, 2009) for a different analysis of 
leading emitters and responsibilities. 
PETSONK_FM T2.DOC 5/7/2009  4:25:33 PM  
462 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:433 
Recognizing this need to exert participation and compliance 
pressure on potential “lone rangers,” environmental agreements have 
developed provisions on trade with non-Parties that can be used to 
close the docking stations into which participants would otherwise 
connect. For example, CITES restricts trade among Parties in species 
and specimens of species that are endangered, especially those for 
which the trade itself contributes to the endangerment, and it allows 
its Parties to treat as non-Parties, and therefore prohibit trade in 
endangered species, with Parties that fail to comply.89 Similarly, the 
Montreal Protocol bans trade with non-Parties, and its Compliance 
Committee has issued determinations that non-complying Parties 
should be treated as non-Parties, thereby terminating their ability to 
dock into the market for trade in ozone-depleting substances.90 
Interestingly, these trade with non-Party provisions also open an 
implicit or explicit docking station for nations that are not formally 
members of the treaties to dock into the treaties if they comply with 
the basic requirements of the treaties. For example, Article X of 
CITES, “Trade with States not Party to the Convention,” essentially 
allows non-Parties to “dock into” the highly regulated permissible 
trade in endangered species and specimens provided that the non-
Parties are in compliance with the requirements of the Treaty.91 The 
Basel Convention allows trade in hazardous wastes with non-Parties 
provided that the trade proceeds under a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement that is notified to the Parties and that does not derogate 
from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes as 
provided for in the Convention.92 And the Montreal Protocol’s ban on 
trade in ODS with non-Parties does not apply if the non-Party is in 
compliance with the affirmative obligations to phase out ODS and 
has provided data to demonstrate that compliance.93 While the trade-
with-non-Parties provision is not a “docking station” for non-Parties, 
it does provide a starting point for consideration of whether 
provisions allowing non-Parties to dock into a Copenhagen accord 
might provide a useful transition mechanism to welcome new entrants 
even before the formal requirements for accession have been 
completed. 
 
 89. CITES, supra note 51, art. X. 
 90. Montreal Protocol, supra note 53, art. 8. 
 91. See CITES, supra note 51, art. X. 
 92. Basel Convention, supra note 52, art. 11. 
 93. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 53, art. 4(8). 
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III. ‘DOCKING STATIONS’ IN U.S. CLIMATE LEGISLATION 
The bulk of this article has been devoted to an examination of 
how docking stations might assist, substantively and procedurally, in 
welcoming new nations into a Copenhagen multilateral climate 
accord. However, given the timing and the interplay between 
domestic U.S. climate legislation and the international climate treaty 
framework, it is also worth considering whether docking stations 
might usefully be applied in the context of national climate legislation 
in the United States.94 
When the U.S. Congress enacts cap and trade legislation, 
Congress – which has the constitutional authority to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations,95 including commerce in emissions 
allowances – can set the terms on which other nations can dock into 
the U.S. carbon market.  Congress can do so directly, without need 
for a treaty, by simply specifying the terms on which carbon market 
access will be granted, and providing for agreements or arrangements 
that meet the terms that Congress specifies.96 The President may, if he 
chooses, negotiate treaties and other agreements that meet these 
standards. If he chooses, he may submit the treaties to the Senate for 
its advice and consent by two-thirds majority. But once Congress has 
enacted, and the President has signed, legislation specifying the 
requirements other nations must meet if they wish to access the U.S. 
carbon market, and authorizing the President to enter into 
agreements and arrangements that meet these standards, then 
bilateral agreements and arrangements negotiated by the President 
that meet the standards specified by Congress can be sufficient 
without further action by the Congress to make them effective.97 
 
 94. See Fred Krupp, President, Envtl. Def. Fund, Remarks at the Conference on Climate 
and Energy Policy: From Poznan to Copenhagen via Washington (Nov. 10, 2008), 
http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?contentID=8800 (“[I]n almost any political configuration, and 
certainly given the anticipated composition of the Senate and the House in the next Congress, 
America will have to make progress on domestic legislation in order to be able to participate 
effectively in the negotiation – and implementation – of a new international framework. The old 
strategy of negotiating the international agreement first, and then going to Congress for the 
implementing legislation, won’t work.”). 
 95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. . . 
.”). 
 96. See Petsonk Testimony, supra note 71, at 14-16; BLUEPRINT, supra note 51. 
 97. In his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson stated: 
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified 
grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may 
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Such an approach has several advantages. First, it enables the 
Congress to give the Executive Branch clear direction about the 
requirements that other nations must meet to obtain access to the 
U.S. carbon market. Second, if the President decides to negotiate 
greenhouse gas emissions targets with a small group of major emitting 
nations, as has been proposed, and if Congress establishes docking 
stations in national legislation by specifying the terms upon which this 
group of nations could gain access to the U.S. carbon market, then 
negotiations conducted by the Executive Branch could enable these 
nations to dock into the U.S. carbon market via a set of bilateral 
agreements or even a single plurilateral agreement, without further 
action by the Congress.98 
Third, such an approach strengthens the hand of the Executive 
Branch in seeking commitments from other nations to cap and reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions. Professor Ken Dam has pointed out 
 
challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this 
factor of relativity. 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his 
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. 2 In these circumstances, [343 U.S. 579, 
636]   and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the 
federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it 
usually means that the Federal Government [343 U.S. 579, 637]   as an undivided 
whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of 
Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude 
of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any 
who might attack it. 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence 
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on 
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely 
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than 
on abstract theories of law. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will 
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 98. The agreements would, of course, need to be notified to Congress under the Case Act, 
1 U.S.C. § 112b(a). Such an approach would enable U.S. climate legislation to achieve most of 
the objectives outlined in proposals for enactment of “Climate Protection Authority,” without 
necessitating a separate and potentially difficult vote in the Senate on the question of whether 
the Senate should relinquish its constitutional authority to give consent to treaties by a 67-vote 
supermajority. See William J. Antholis & Nigel Purvis, The Case for a Climate Protection 
Authority (Brookings Inst., Apr. 10, 2009), available at http://www.brookings. 
edu/opinions/2009/0127_climate_change_antholis_purvis.aspx. See also Nigel Purvis, Trading 
Approaches on Climate: The Case for “Climate Protection Authority, (Resources for the Future, 
Summer 2008), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/Resources/RFF-Resources-169_ 
TradingApproachesOnClimate.pdf. 
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that Cordell Hull, President Franklin Roosevelt’s Secretary of State 
from 1933 to 1945, realized nearly sixty years ago that unilateral 
market-opening measures are “not in the political cards in most 
countries and certainly not in the U.S. Congress. One could not 
expect to get something for nothing . . .  [r]eciprocity was the key.”99  
By enacting strong caps on the total greenhouse gas emissions of 
America’s major emitting sectors, creating an emissions cap-and-
trade market, and establishing docking stations in U.S. legislation that 
afford other major emitting nations carbon market access if follow 
suit, the U.S. Congress can play a true leadership role, and enable the 
President and the Executive Branch to play a true leadership role in 
the global battle against climate change.100 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this article has been to identify docking stations as a 
new method of welcoming the voluntary participation of sovereign 
nations in the effort to avert globally catastrophic climate change. 
The article reviewed the existing climate treaty framework and the 
obstacles to participation of new nations that provisions in the 
existing framework raise. The article then proposed three substantive 
types of docking stations – national, sectoral, and adaptation. It 
outlined the procedural steps that nations could take to create these 
docking stations in a Copenhagen accord and in U.S. climate 
legislation. It examined analogies in several international agreements, 
 
 99. See Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the 
WTO: An Essay on the Concept of Rights in International Trade, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS 709, 712 
(2004-2005). As Professor Dam notes, historically, Congress has exercised its Commerce Clause 
powers in a variety of ways to establish requirements for market access in other areas, 
sometimes in ways that intersect with the President’s negotiation of international agreements, 
and sometimes without such intersection. Id. at 726. For example, the United States has 
accorded “most favored nation” trading status to its trading partners by means of bilateral 
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation; bilateral executive agreements involving 
reciprocal recognition of trade privileges, disciplines and benefits; multilateral agreements, 
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the agreements adopted 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization; and by means of congressional enactments 
legislatively extending MFN treatment to trading partners. See the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2009); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2136 (2009). 
 100. A legislative proposal released on March 31, 2009, by the chairman of the House 
Energy & Commerce Committee and the chairman of that committee’s Energy & Environment 
Sub-Committee, offers one set of possible options by which Congress could specify the 
requirements that other nations would have to meet if they wish to gain access to the U.S. 
carbon market. See American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACEA) §§ 754(a)(2), 743 (text 
and summary available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=1560&Itemid=1). 
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and noted possibilities for including docking stations for non-Parties.  
Through this exploration, the article has sought to create new 
avenues for broader participation in efforts to confront the signal 
environmental challenge of the 21st century. 
 
